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1 Introduction
Cultural policy has been traditionally concerned with providing financial support for the arts,
for heritage institutions and for cultural industries. Many economists and cultural policy
scholars have discussed the benefits and costs of indirect vs. direct public support to cultural
activities, with the former being generally devised as tax exemptions on donations while the
latter is the use of public revenues to provide cultural services or subsidize producers (Throsby
2010). However, within the field of direct public support, less attention has been paid so far
to the choice between supplying in-house produced cultural services and supporting external
cultural organizations. In this paper we investigate the actual drivers of a government’s
choice between these two alternatives adopting a positive approach to the subject.
We argue that support to cultural institutions may be analyzed as a form of outsourcing,
so we make reference to the by now vast empirical literature on outsourcing of public services
(Domberger and Jensen 1997; Bel and Fageda 2007; 2009) and extend it to the cultural sector.
However, unlike services such as public transport or waste disposal, cultural policy is not one
of those governmental functions that are either outsourced or not. It consists of many actions
and each of them may be outsourced, so that there is a continuum of positions. Unlike most
empirical contributions, we therefore choose a non-dichotomic measure of outsourcing. We
make use of public accounting data and adopt the share of the subsidies a government grants
to cultural institutions on overall cultural spending as our variable of interest. Our focus is
therefore on the value, not the number of outsourced services. Our focus is therefore on the
value, not the number of outsourced services; in fact, we assume that the higher the value,
the more relevant the activity.
A number of empirical papers have appeared in recent years adopting a positive approach
to local governments’ cultural policy and using public spending data (Getzner 2002; Noonan
2007; Werck, Heyndels and Geys 2008; Benito, Bastida and Vicente 2013), but they all aim
at explaining the level of spending, not the type. Our focus is on the determinants a◆ecting
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the choice between direct production and outsourcing of cultural services at a local level of
government. We concentrate our analysis on 106 Italian municipalities, namely the cities
which are provincial administrative centres, in the time span 1998-2008. Italian cities are
interesting in that they are big spenders in culture: they pay for libraries, own museums and
theatres, and many of them have organized very popular cultural festivals in recent years.
Up until 15-20 years ago Italy’s public cultural policy was, at all levels of government and
in the vast majority of cases, in-house production of cultural services, but in recent years,
especially at the municipal level, a lot of variability has appeared as to the relative size of
in-house production with respect to overall spending.
There are many reasons why a government may prefer to outsource a function: some
of them are general, some are specific to the function itself. Among the general reasons,
private production is often expected to be less costly than public production, as the latter is
a◆ected by government failures. Private production may be cost wise beneficial because it
triggers competition and the choice of a more ecient production scale. Finally, there may
be political economy explanations underlying the choice whether or not to outsource the
production of cultural services. As for the specific traits of cultural policy that may influence
a policy-maker’s decision in this respect, peculiar measures of asset specificity (Hart, Shleifer
and Vishny 1997; Brown and Potoski 2003), tourism and the presence of wealthy patrons
may play a role.
We consider all these possible determinants and use dynamic panel data analysis in our
investigation. Our results show that the main drivers of Italian cities’ choice to outsource
cultural services are two measures of fiscal stress and the share of municipal current spending
on cultural facilities expressing high asset specificity. There is also evidence of a peculiar
electoral cycle, in line with the findings of Dalle Nogare and Galizzi (2011).
The relevance of our contribution is also methodological and goes beyond the restricted
field of cultural policy. Arguably, the use of transfers as a proxy for the value of a government’s
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outsourced services allows quantifying them in a number of governmental functions so far
not so often considered by the literature on outsourcing, such as education.
The paper is organized in the following way: section 2 surveys the relevant literature;
section 3 briefly outlines the exact focus of our investigation; section 4 describes the raising
role of municipal governments in shaping cultural policy in Italy and how it has changed in
the recent years; section 5 discusses our dependent variable and illustrates the independent
ones; section 6 describes the estimation strategy; section 7 shows our results; section 8 is
about the robustness checks while section 9 finally concludes.
2 Related Literature
The paper relates to two strands of literature. First, by focusing on the mode of provi-
sion of cultural services we contribute to the literature which analyzes the factors a◆ecting
outsourcing and contracting out of local public services.
This body of works uses local governments data to unveil the determinants a◆ecting the
decision whether to supply public services in-house or externally. These contributions test
for the significance of both economic and political factors, which make reference to various
extent to the public choice approach, the transaction costs literature as well as to political
economy models. The empirical evidence generally comes from cross sectional studies across
local jurisdictions of specific countries (Bel and Fageda 2007) and varies to the extent they
analyze several services (Brown and Potoski 2003; Levin and Tadelis 2010, e.g.) or focus just
on one (Dijkgraaf, Gradus and Melenberg 2003; Walls, Macauley and Anderson 2005, e.g.).
Among the economic determinants, various measures of local governments’ fiscal stance
and economic eciency have been generally considered to have a positive relation with the
likelihood to privatize or contracting out local public services (Kodrzycki 1998; Dijkgraaf,
Gradus and Melenberg 2003). Other studies have provided empirical ground showing how
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the level of transaction costs and contractual incompleteness (such as asset specificity, or the
diculty of performance monitoring) are central in determining when a local service may be
outsourced (Brown and Potoski 2003; Levin and Tadelis 2010). Further, potential cases of
quality shading also become an issue here (Jensen and Stonecash 2005).
As for the political factors, interest groups’ pressure and ideological attitudes have been
considered as possible drivers for public service delivery choices. The interest group in-
fluence hypothesis has usually been validated when a broad range of services is analyzed.
For instance, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) find that state laws that impose
accountability requirements in contracting for personnel encourage privatization, whereas
strong public unions discourage it. However, later studies (Kodrzycki 1998; Walls, Macauley
and Anderson 2005) testing this hypothesis do not confirm these results. The ideological
preferences of elected representatives or of the local population have been considered as an
explanatory factor as well. A negative relationship between leftism and privatization or con-
tracting out is what these empirical contributions generally test. However, ideology is found
to be (moderately) significant in very few studies (Dijkgraaf, Gradus and Melenberg 2003;
Walls, Macauley and Anderson 2005, e.g.).
If the empirical literature on privatizations and contracting out helps analyze the factors
explaining the delivery choices of local public services in general, cultural economics pro-
vides an additional and more specific ground for assessing the role of public spending in the
provision of local cultural services. However, the drivers of the mode of public spending for
culture has been only marginally covered.1 The choice between supplying in-house produced
cultural services and supporting external cultural organizations has been analyzed almost
exclusively in a political economy context studying how di◆erent systems of direct support
a◆ect allocation decisions of public funds. The literature highlights that continental Europe’s
experience has generally been more oriented towards in-house production of cultural services
1Some studies have focused on the holdup e ect of public subsidies (Bises and Padovano 2004) or on their
substitution or complementarity with private funding (Brooks 2000; Borgonovi and O’Hare 2004).
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and, to a lesser extent, government-driven distribution of funds for culture (O’Hagan 1998).
This has led politicians and bureaucrats to have a prominent role in allocation decisions with
potential biases and rent-seeking problems (Grampp 1989; Frey 2003). On the contrary, UK
and a number of other countries, such as Israel, have developed a peculiar model of public
intervention in the cultural field, in which subsidies to cultural organizations play a bigger
role. In this model, government delegates the allocation of funds to arm’s length agencies
(Arts Councils). Concerns about the possible distortions caused by a government’s direct
involvement in the process lead Van der Ploeg (2006) to claim the arm’s length model may be
a superior solution, as it leaves decision-making responsibilities to an independent statutory
body made up of experts in the art and cultural field.2
A government’s choice to adopt the arm’s length system is then implicitly suggested to be
the consequence of a government’s wish to tie one’s hands. In continental Europe, however,
arm’s length agencies in the cultural field are not at all common, in particular at the local
level. As a result, the drivers of subsidies and grants to cultural organizations, whenever
these are present and relevant, need to be considered in a di◆erent perspective. As already
stated, our choice is here to consider them as a form of outsourcing.
3 Defining outsourcing in the cultural field
While most of the literature on outsourcing has focused on contracting out arrangements
for publicly provided services, in the cultural sector outsourcing may take up two distinct
forms: contracting out (which we will define as contractual outsourcing) and the financing
of an external organization for producing and delivering a cultural service (non-contractual
outsourcing), which may be intended as a relational or implicit contract (Hart 2001). The two
2However, experts are likely to enjoy some form of discretionary power and asymmetrical information in
the cultural policy decision making process, which can arguably lead to rent seeking behavior as well (Mazza
2003; Rizzo and Throsby 2006).
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are not exactly equivalent, but only in the sense that non-contractual outsourcing is a more
flexible form of outsourcing, since it is not regulated by a multi-year contract and therefore,
from a government’s perspective, it does not imply a long engagement in the provision per
se of a service or in its outsourced mode. In the cultural field, subsidizing is very similar to
outsourcing especially when the subsidized cultural organization heavily depends on public
support and produces cultural services for the wide public, which is often the case. Even if
grants are for the production of a cultural service (say, a festival) which was not previously
produced in-house, arguably this can still be defined as outsourcing, because a government
could have decided to produce the same service in-house. Moreover, both with contractual
and non-contractual outsourcing a government stays in control of the size and, to some extent,
of the contents of cultural policy actions.3
The focus of this contribution is on non-contractual outsourcing. Anecdotal evidence
leads us to believe that it constitutes a great proportion of total outsourcing in the case of
Italian cities4, though it is not really possible to assess how well it proxies total outsourcing
due to lack of detailed data on municipal governments’ spending for the purchase of services,
the accounting item comprising contractual outsourcing.5
A reasonable proxy for non-contractual outsourcing is public transfers to cultural insti-
tutions. Aggregate data referring to cultural expenditure of all 8.092 Italian municipalities
show that, in overall cultural spending, transfers have been the fastest growing item (+41%)
between 2000 and 2008 (ISTAT).
Following Brown and Potoski (2003), we do not intend outsourcing as a synonym for
3This would not happen if a government decided to switch from in-house production to tax-exemptions
or vouchers as their preferred support strategy in the market of cultural services.
4For instance, festivals are very often organized by cultural institutions heavily subsidised by municipal
governments. As they usually did not pre-exist as in-house produced services, contractual outsourcing is not
the only viable option, and the easy choice for a mayor is to avoid it, given the high percentage of contracts
taken to court by cultural firms and institutions who have not been selected as providers.
5Available fiscal data on expenditures are broken down into di erent accounting items, but the one named
“purchase of services” is a very heterogeneous one, including from electricity and heating costs to contracting
out.
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delegation of production to privately-owned institutions. Jensen and Stonecash (2005) claim
that many contributions to the literature on outsourcing consider the notions of privatizations
and outsourcing as equivalent or similar, but we take a di◆erent perspective. The reason why
we do so is that we are convinced that this is particularly appropriate in the field of cultural
policy, where we would miss a lot if we only looked at governments subsidizing private firms.
The choice of a government wishing to support the supply of cultural services is between three
types of recipients: private, public or hybrid firms or non-profit organizations. In particular,
hybrid private-public institutions often play a relevant role in the cultural field (Schuster
1998), and this has also been the case in Italy in recent years. We argue that what matters
is not the nature of the ownership of the service provider per se, but the legal rules shaping
its management’s action boundaries. As long as all institutions, except governments, are
subject to the same legal framework (i.e. they can all sign the same type of work contracts,
make use of voluntary work etc.), outsourcing to any of them can serve the same purpose,
and a governments’ choice between them may just be driven by the actual presence locally
of potential partners of one or the other type. In fact, Domberger, Hall and Li (1995) find
that the e◆ects of outsourcing both on costs and quality are the same irrespective of the
ownership of the service provider.
4 Recent trends in Italian municipalities cultural pol-
icy
In the last two decades Italian municipalities have witnessed a growing role within public
cultural spending. Traditionally, cultural expenditure in Italy had been mainly public and
highly centralised, but towards the end of the last century central government’s share rapidly
declined from around 60% to 50%. According to Bodo and Spada (2004) in 2000 central
government accounted for 52% of total public spending for culture, regions for 15%, provinces
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for 3%, and municipalities for 30%. More recent but less detailed data Bodo and Bodo
(2007)6 for the last decade highlight that the decentralisation process has gone even further,
mainly as a consequence of the stark decrease in central government expenditure (-8.6%
in the period 2000-2010). The share of central government’s expenditure for culture has
therefore declined to 36% of total public cultural expenditure. Specularly, local governments’
cultural expenditure – dominated by municipalities – increased to reach nearly two thirds
of total public cultural spending. Municipalities have been especially active in the fields of
the performing arts, heritage and contemporary art, which arguably comes from their being
owners of libraries, museums and theatres.
Interestingly, the decentralization of Italian cultural policy has gone along with a pro-
cess of growing outsourcing, a completely absent phenomenon in this governmental field of
action before the mid-90’s.7 New European laws on economic services of general interest
have triggered in the country a general trend towards the outsourcing of public services. The
process has however witnessed a lot of variability in time, sectors and levels of government
(Scarpa et al. 2010). Although Italian public law experts have generally understood cul-
ture as a social rather than an economic service, public intervention in this field has been
characterized by an outsourcing trend, too. Outsourcing is common in the management of
festivals but it is not infrequent to find that also theatres, libraries and some non-core museum
functions (bookshops, tickets sale) are outsourced. Anecdotal evidence suggests contractual
outsourcing has been growing at all levels of government, although no systematic analysis
of quantitative data on the phenomenon and its variability has yet been published. As for
non-contractual outsourcing, no systematic collection of data has been made so far, either.8
6The breakdown is only between state and local expenditures, without any further distinction of the local
authorities among the regions, provinces and municipalities.
7Law n. 4, 4-01-1993 on museum’s ancillary services (bookshops, catering etc.) was the first law in Italy
allowing outsourcing in the cultural field.
8Notice that in a number of cases municipalities have informally delegated the production of cultural
services to newly created private-public institutions. In most cases these hybrid institutions have private
partners (often banking foundations). Some authors argue that their proliferation has often been used by
mayors as a temporary escape from the budget constraints imposed by the Domestic Stability Pact, which
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However, the number of private cultural institutions has boomed in the last 20 years, a quite
new phenomenon for Italy.9 Recent inquiries on the financial resources of cultural founda-
tions highlight that they generally have little endowments and mainly rely on donations by
banking foundations, firms and, often prominently, on public support (Centro di Documen-
tazione sulle Fondazioni 2007). In this perspective, their booming may be the reflection of a
rise in non- contractual outsourcing.
The data on the 106 Italian provincial administrative centres, which we will concentrate
upon, are quite illustrative of the growing trend in non-contractual outsourcing. In the time
span 1998-2008 the average yearly per capita current spending for culture is 40.9 euros, equal
to 4.4% of total current spending. This figure is rather stable over the years, as the trend of
cultural current spending has mirrored that of total current spending (Figure 1), probably a
sign of a prevailing top-bottom procedure in municipal budgeting.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
The average share of cultural transfers over total cultural spending is 0.20, a value almost
double the average share of total transfers over total expenditures. This highlights that in
the cultural field municipal governments tend to produce less and subsidize more than in
other fields of action. Figure 2 highlights a growing trend of per capita cultural transfers.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
As this trend is stronger than the one of total cultural expenditure (in fact, in real terms
the latter is rather stagnating), the ratio of cultural transfers over total cultural expenditure
is growing over the period10, too (Figure 3). This confirms the anecdotal evidence about the
growing number of cities adopting informal outsourcing strategies in the cultural field.
does not impose restraints on publicly-owned institutions. We argue this may not be a correct interpretation
of the phenomenon where private partners play a major role, which is very often the case.
9We make reference to civil law foundations here; banking foundations were born in 1992 out of the
privatization process of the banking system and have a di erent legal status.
10Table A1 in the appendix shows both the within and between variation of the ratio of cultural transfers.
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[FIGURE 3 HERE]
5 Data and Variables
In order to investigate the determinants of a government’s choice to either provide cultural
services through public transfers or produce them in-house, we consider the cultural policies
of 106 Italian cities which are provincial administrative centres11 in the 1998-2008 period.12
There are three main reasons why we focus on this subset of Italian municipalities. First, these
cities are the most populated towns in their respective geographical areas, so they represent
Italy’s “urban contexts”.13 Second, in the majority of cases, these cities are historic centres
with a rich cultural life14 and, arguably, with the most relevant cultural policies at the local
level. Third, these municipalities are those where election candidates for a mayor position
are almost always members of national parties, thus making political competition and local
government orientation clearer than in smaller urban centres. Allowing smaller municipalities
to be part of the sample would blur the e◆ect of political variables. In line with the literature
previously analyzed, our empirical specification tests the following relationships:
y = f(FISC,ECON,POL)
11Their number has been slightly varying in the course of time with the institution of new provinces. We
have considered the cities which were provincial administrative centres in 1998. Notice that there is a couple
of cases where two distinct cities jointly share the provincial administrative centre status (Massa-Carrara,
and Pesaro-Urbino). In these cases we have included both cities in our sample. This is why our sample
consists in 106 cities, while the Italian provinces in 1998 were only 104.
12Data on cultural spending of Italian municipalities are available from the Italian Home O ce since 1998.
1999 is the time the Domestic Stability Pact came into force. This Pact mirrors the European Stability and
Growth Pact and imposes the monitoring of local accounts by central government. In the o cial “Certificati
consuntivi” (final budget balances) we consider the headings “impegni”, as these certify expenses that have
actually been decided in the year of interest.
13This probably also means more reliable data, because the smaller the towns, the lower the quality of
local governments’ budget reports. The cities we consider are quite di erent in size (they have a population
between about 20.000 and 2,5 millions), allowing to capture size e ects if present.
14Today’s administrative centres often identify with the capitals of the small states Italy was divided into
before it became a unified country in 1861. This is the main reason why they are so rich in cultural heritage.
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Where y is a proxy for municipal outsourcing in the cultural field while FISC, ECON
and POL represent three groups of main explanatory variables, expressing respectively fiscal,
economic, and political factors. Table A1 in the appendix presents the summary statistics for
these variables, while Table A2 relates the variables selected with those commonly adopted
in the literature on outsourcing. We choose as dependent variable the ratio between current
cultural transfers and current cultural expenditures (CULTRANSFRATIO).We argue that
the larger the share of municipal transfers in total current cultural spending, the higher is
the level of outsourcing in cultural services. Empirical works on local services privatiza-
tion usually adopt categorical dependent variables to measure the extent of local services
outsourcing. The use of municipal transfers arguably represents a novel methodological ap-
proach. Considering their weight in overall cultural expenditure allows us to better assess
the real economic extent of the scope of government. Moreover, as the value of the ratio
varies over time within the same city, using this dependent variable allows us to consider the
determinants of outsourcing in a dynamic empirical setting.
As for the drivers of outsourcing, fiscal variables capture how central government restric-
tions on local finance influence the mode of provision of local services. There are two types of
variables in this case. First, the e◆ect of di◆erent fiscal rules on groups of municipalities can
be tested through dummies capturing institutional heterogeneity.15 Second, measures related
to the “fiscal stance” of local governments may capture fiscal stress, i.e. whether or not the
fiscal rule in force is (almost) binding in a given municipality. In Italy, all municipalities over
5.000 inhabitants are subject to the same fiscal rule, the so-called Domestic Stability Pact,
which came into force in 1999 and sets ceilings on expenditures and deficits of sub-national
governments (Ambrosanio and Bordignon 2007). As the Domestic Stability Pact restrictions
apply to all the cities we consider, we cannot use this information do detect variability in
fiscal conditions across municipalities.16 We consider instead two di◆erent variables of the
15These dummies are frequently adopted in contributions on US states’ and cities’ outsourcing policies.
16In theory, some of the time variability may be due to the repeated reforms the Domestic Stability Pact
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second type. The first is deficit per capita (DEFICIT ). We use it as a proxy for fiscal stress,
as high deficits are likely to cause a municipality to violate the restrictions imposed by the
Domestic Stability Pact, and may therefore induce a mayor to impose a cut in the near future.
The second is the value of all other cultural expenditures (OTHERCULTEXP), obtained as
the di◆erence between per capita cultural current spending and cultural transfers. In fact,
a Granger test shows that the value of these cultural expenditures causes cultural transfers,
but not vice versa.17 We interpret this as a sign that culture departments are assigned a bud-
get, and that grants and subsidies are usually determined as what is left after spending for
in-house production, interest repayments etc. The relevant item is the size of the budget of
the cultural department, and we proxy it by OTHERCULTEXP, thus avoiding endogeneity
issues.
Economic variables address issues linked to economic eciency arguments. First, we
control for the possibly divergent dynamics of public servants’ productivity with respect to
private employees, along the lines of Baumol’s cost-disease argument (Baumol and Bowen
1966). Using OECD data at the national level, we construct the variable (CPGW/CPI ) as
government-consumption price deflator over GDP deflator. When wage costs in the public
sector increase more than market prices, we expect a positive relation between the index and
the proportion of outsourced cultural services.
Second, in order to control for city-specific factors, we use population size (POPULA-
TION ), per capita income level (INCOME) and a measure of asset specificity in municipal
cultural activities (CULTASSET ) as possible drivers of municipal governments’ outsourcing
behavior. While in many works focusing on local public utilities city size captures the e◆ect
of scale economies in service delivery, in the cultural field population is more likely to express
the possibility to take advantage of competition from a larger number of service providers. As
was subject to in the time span we consider. We argue however that this is unlikely, which has to do with
the absence of a rigid enforcement mechanism for the budget rule, except for its informational requirements
17Considering two lags, the p-values are 0.000 and 0.378 respectively.
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cultural industries and arts organizations tend to localize in larger and metropolitan urban
areas, we expect that this covariate is positively related to the dependent variable. In turn,
per capita income level of a city is generally considered in the literature on local services
privatization (Hirsch 1995; Greene 1996) as a proxy of public preferences for private service
delivery.
In order to control for asset specificity in public cultural facilities we use the share of
municipal current spending on ‘Libraries, Museums and Galleries’ over total cultural expen-
ditures (CULTASSET ). As compared to theatres, performing arts and the organizations of
cultural events, libraries and museums often represent the facilities that provide cultural
services with the highest level of asset specificity, as the expenditures devoted for the conser-
vation and maintenance of the book and artworks collections often represent sunk costs and
are hardly re-deployable in the short term; finally, monitoring is hard to implement (Brown
and Potoski 2003; Levin and Tadelis 2010). Since there are no complete data on cultural
facilities at the municipal level, we use local government’s financial involvement in these
cultural activities as a proxy for their relative importance. We therefore expect that cities
with a higher share of cultural spending dedicated to museums and libraries with respect to
theatres and festivals are likely to be less outsourcing-prone.
Finally, political variables account for the possible influence of the distortions induced
by politics on the behavior of policy-makers and for the strength of pressure groups. The
variable LEFTRIGHT is a categorical variable capturing the left-wing orientation of the
ruling government, and is a standard control in the empirical literature on outsourcing, while
ELECTION YEAR and TERMLIMIT are dummies taking value 1 if the year is an election
year or is in a mayor’s second (and therefore last) term of oce respectively. The variable
ELECTION YEAR is used to capture politicians’ manipulations of governmental outputs so
as to favor their chances of re-election. As for TERMLIMIT, political economy studies point
out that because elections have no disciplinary role for a ‘lame duck’, the latter is more prone
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to deviate from the median voter’s preferences (Besley and Case 1995). Anecdoctal evidence
shows that Italian mayors are sometimes tempted, after their last mandate, to consider job
o◆ers from non-profit organizations, so it may well be that in order to induce them, they
grant these institutions more money before the end of their political career.
Finally, to control for additional factors specific to the cultural and leisure sector, we
consider both a measure of the role of a city as a touristic destination (TOURISM ) and local
cultural private spending (PRIVCULTEXP). The former is the number of tourist accommo-
dation establishments normalised by population. As the tourist sector benefits from a city’s
provision of cultural activities this variable is used to test whether the local tourist sector
exerts pressure on the municipal government in favour or against outsourcing. As for local
cultural private spending, potentially it may condition a mayor’s outsourcing strategy in two
ways: on one hand, it may induce her to squeeze non-contractual outsourcing, as cultural
institutions may have alternative (private) patrons; on the other hand, the very presence of a
rich private patron may make the birth of a hybrid, public-private cultural institution more
likely. Unfortunately, there are no aggregate data at the local level concerning cultural and
artistic activities sponsored by private firms. We therefore consider only cultural spending
of non-profit organizations and more precisely those of the so- called banking foundations.
These non-profit organizations are by far the richest and most active private subjects in fi-
nancing projects in the areas of arts and culture. There are 88 banking foundations in total
(17 of them spend 80% of aggregate expenditures), and they are mainly concentrated in the
northern and central parts of the country (Di Lascio and Segre 2007). As the institutional
mandate of banking foundations allows them to fund projects and initiatives only in the area
they are located in, we use per capita expenditure by banking foundations as a reliable proxy
of private cultural spending at the local level.18
18Banking foundations are organized in an association, ACRI, from which we got the spending data for
each of them. Some banking foundations are present in more than one city. Dalle Nogare and Galizzi (2011)
dealt with these cases and imputed a portion of their overall cultural spending to every city they operate
in. We use their series and integrated them for the 2006-08 years following the same methodology. The only
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6 Estimation Strategy
Our dataset consists of a panel, and the model we estimate is the following:
yit = ⇢yit + x
0
it  + ↵i + "it
where yit is current cultural transfers over current cultural expenditure of city i in year
t, xit is the vector of the corresponding values for the explanatory variables, ↵i captures the
source of unobserved heterogeneity across cities and "it is a idiosyncratic disturbance term.
One of the major shortcomings of most empirical contributions on outsourcing of local
public services is the use of cross-section data with lack of consideration of the dynamics
(Bel and Fageda 2007). The choice of a dynamic specification is justified by the fact that
decisions concerning fiscal policy often persist over time (status quo bias due to the nature
of the decision-making process underlying it in a democracy).
A statistical inspection of both nominator and denominator of our dependent variable
confirm that they are AR(1)19, so persistence is an issue we cannot disregard. Lack of
consideration of yit would generate inconsistent estimates. In other words, we take advantage
of the panel nature of our dataset to control for the (possibly large) e◆ect of last year’s
proportion of outsourced cultural services on this year’s value of the same ratio. Given our
choice of a dynamic model, we rely on the use of Generalized Method of Moments estimation
techniques. As a matter of fact, given the fact that our panel is (slightly) unbalanced and the
relative size of N and T, Monte Carlo tests show that Arellano and Bond (1991) estimates
outperforms all other estimators (Judson and Owen 1999). However, Arellano and Bond
(1991) estimates have often been found to be characterized by a weak instruments problem.
Moreover, as they rely on transformation of the original model into its di◆erenced version,
exceptions are the series for the cities Fondazione CARIPLO operates in, which we re-calculated completely,
following the discovery of a mistake in the previous imputations.
19Fisher tests detect no unit root instead.
they do not allow to estimate time invariant explanatory variables, and some of the extra
variables we intend to use for the robustness checks are time invariant. As a consequence, we
adopt Arellano and Bover (1995) – Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM as our preferred
estimation strategy. To increase eciency, Blundell and Bond develop an approach outlined
in Arellano and Bover: they di◆erence the instruments to make them exogenous to the fixed
e◆ects instead of transforming the regressors to expunge them. This is valid assuming that
changes in the instrumenting variables are uncorrelated with the fixed e◆ects.20 Unlike AB
(1991) estimates, system GMM allows consideration of time invariant explanatory variables.
7 Results
The main findings of our analysis on Italian cities’ outsourcing strategies in the cultural field
are summarised in Table 1.
[Table 1 here]
The dependent variable is the ratio between cultural transfers and total cultural expen-
ditures (CULTRANSFRATIO). All covariates are in real terms, normalized by population
(except the political dummies and the variables expressing a ratio), and for all of them (ex-
cept the political ones) we initially consider both their current value and lag one.21 The
results obtained by the use of our preferred estimation strategy, namely system GMM, are
in column 4, while a reduced model is presented in column 5. For comparative purposes, in
columns 1-3 we show fixed e◆ects, fixed e◆ects with correction for first-order autoregression
and Arellano-Bond GMM estimates respectively, all of them with robust standard errors.22
20In order to apply system GMM, ⇢ must be less than 1, which in our case all the autocorrelation tests
confirm, and cities in which outsourcing grows more rapidly are not systematically closer or farther from
their steady states than slower-growing ones. We have no reason to believe this is not the case.
21We considered introducing time dummies, but an F test always revealed their coe cients were not
significantly di erent from 0.
22We use a static model when considering FE estimates. A Hausman test reveals FE estimates must be
preferred to random e ects estimates. A modified Wald test and a Wooldridge test reveal FE estimates
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Column 6 presents system GMM estimates with a correction for potential endogeneity of the
OTHERCULTEXP variable. In GMM estimates serial correlation in the first-di◆erenced er-
rors at an order higher than 1 implies that the moment conditions used to derive them are not
valid; all of our GMM estimates show no evidence of serial correlation in the first-di◆erenced
errors at order 2.23
In all dynamic panel estimates of Table 1 the dependent variable lagged one is the most
important driver of time t municipal governments’ outsourcing strategies in the cultural
field. System GMM estimates reveal the substantial sluggishness of political conduct in this
governmental domain of action.24 As for the other regressors, most of the significant ones
are so in all columns, and their sign and size is quite similar. We interpret this coherence
as a sign of robustness. The determinants of Italian cities’ outsourcing policy in the cultural
field are found to be quite few in the period of interest. In fact, the estimated coecients of
some potential drivers are never significant. We will consider these first, and then illustrate
the significant ones. The relative price dynamics variable CPGW/CPI is never significant.
This may be the e◆ect of considering a national proxy for the gap in public and private
productivity; unfortunately, there is no local indicator we can use. Ideology does not seem
to play a role and that is again in accordance with most empirical works on outsourcing
and privatizations at the local level of government published so far. POPULATION is never
significant either.
The four variables that emerge as significant drivers of Italian cities’ outsourcing policies
in the cultural domain are:
• the level of fiscal stress
are a ected by both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the residuals. A modified Bhargava et al.
Durbin-Watson test on the xtregar estimates, confronted with the critical values in Bhargava, Franzini and
Narendranathan (1982), highlight that here, too, we must reject the null hypothesis of 0 autocorrelation.
23Sargan tests are not applicable because of the use of robust standard errors.
24The coe cient of lagged CULTRANSFRATIO is bigger in columns 4-6; this is consistent with the
observation of a downward bias in the AB GMM estimator when the true value of the lagged dependent
variable is high (Blundell and Bond 1998).
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• the dynamics of the value of other cultural expenditures
• the degree of asset specificity, as expressed by the relative size of the expenditures for
museums and libraries with respect to those for theatres and festivals
• the timing of elections
The DEFICIT coecient has the correct sign: the higher the deficit, the stronger the incen-
tive to outsource. The fiscal variable OTHERCULTEXP is a significant regressor both at
time t and at time t-1. By interpreting this evidence together with Figure 1 and a Granger
test revealing that OTHERCULTEXP causes CULTRANSFRATIO but not vice versa, we
conclude that transfers are used as a bu◆er to keep the value of overall cultural expenditure
at a desired level: in case of a rise of other cultural expenditures, some services are infor-
mally outsourced, possibly in the hope to reduce costs. It is as if cultural departments were
given each year a budget, which is then divided into direct spending and transfers, and this
choice depended on last year’s choice, with more outsourcing being the chosen option today
if last year’s value of other cultural spending was high. This is compatible with the idea
that the head of the cultural department is conscious the mayor follows a top-down budget
procedure, and informally outsources cultural services whenever producing in-house becomes
more costly. In some sense, this interpretation hints at the idea that, also indirectly, fiscal
stress does play a role in a local government’s outsourcing policy.
CULTASSET is almost always significant and with positive sign. This again is in line
with our expectations: outsourcing is less dangerous, in terms of risks associated with the
management of the cultural stock involved, in the field of the performing arts. Therefore, a
higher expenditure for museums and libraries, proxying for the presence of a larger numbers
of such institutions owned by a municipal government, impacts the relative value of a city’s
outsourced public cultural activities negatively. The significance of the ELECTION YEAR
variable and its negative sign may seem surprising, but in fact, this is coherent with what
19
Dalle Nogare and Galizzi (2011) conclude when considering the determinants of Italian cities’
levels of cultural spending. They claim that there is a peculiar electoral cycle in Italy at the
municipal level of government, by which, in an election year, resources are re-directed by
mayors to governmental functions which voters most care for, and culture is not one of them.
Our analysis enriches those findings by revealing how spending cuts are made: the easiest
way is to curb subsidies to cultural institutions, and this is in fact what the negative sign of
the ELECTION YEAR variable in our analysis shows.
Some other potential drivers are either significant or not, depending on the model and/or
estimation strategy adopted; more investigation is needed (perhaps with the use of more
refined data) to assess their real role. Therefore, we limit ourselves here to consider whether
when they appear to be significant, their sign is consistent with our expectations. INCOME
is not always significant, but it is significant in reduced models, where it has the expected
positive sign. Our term limit hypothesis, by which a mayor in his last term would be more
generous to non-profit cultural organizations, is sometimes rejected by the data, but not
always. When it is found to be significant, it always has a negative sign, which is in contrast
with our prediction of term-limited mayors being more outsourcing-prone.
Interestingly, the variables that turn out to be highly significant in Table 1 are significant
regressors also in models with the level of cultural transfers as dependent variable (Table 2,
columns 7-9), revealing that the dynamics of the denominator of CULTRANSFRATIO do
not play a relevant role: our results are driven by the growth of the nominator, which Figure
3 already anticipated.
[Table 2 here]
Table 2 also presents estimates where the dependent variable is the ratio between subsidies
to private firms and non-profit organizations and total cultural spending (columns 10-12).
20
They do not di◆er substantially from those illustrated in Table 1.25
As models presented in Table 1 do not include private cultural expenditure and tourism
as possible drivers, Table 3 reports the estimates of models including them. Notice that in
specifications including private cultural spending, the sample is smaller.
[Table 3 here]
Columns 13-15 show that there is no evidence of a significant influence of private cul-
tural spending on cities’ outsourcing decisions regarding cultural policies, while not so much
changes as to the significance of the other regressors.The irrelevance of the presence of other
institutions financing cultural activities means that the presence and generosity of private
patrons does not reduce public non-contractual outsourcing.26 As for the e◆ects of tourism,
it is surprising to find that these, too, are irrelevant (columns 16-18).27 The explanation
of this counterintuitive evidence has probably to do with the proxy we use. The number
of hotels is maybe not so correlated with the number of non-resident consumers of cultural
services, both because these are often excursionists and because cultural tourism is not the
only type of tourism present in Italian cities.
8 Robustness Check
As an alternative fiscal stress measure with respect to deficit we considered total current
spending, but it is not significant. This evidence is in accordance with what the literature on
outsourcing generally finds when models have just one governmental function as dependent
variable, especially if it is not a major one.
25These latter estimates are to be taken with caution because the dependent variable slightly changes in
nature in the sample period due to a redefinition of ÒgovernmentÓ by the National Statisctics o ce (Istat)
in 2006.
26This does not deny that some substitution or complementarity e ect is at work; it is the composition of
public spending for culture which appears not to be a ected.
27Dalle Nogare and Galizzi (2011) show that tourism is not a significant driver of a city’s level of current
cultural spending, either
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In order to account for possible non-linear e◆ect of size, we have added the square of
population: it is never significant. We have also considered a sub-sample not including the
cities recently classified by the Italian law as metropolitan areas28, but this does not change
our main results, except for the deficit variable, the significance of which is now weaker
We have introduced a dummy variable capturing the Northcentre-South divide: it is not
significant and does not change the sign and significance of the other regressors. The same
happens when we try with a dummy equal to 1 when a city belongs to an Autonomous Region,
in which the distribution of governmental functions among the di◆erent levels of government
di◆er from the rest of the country.29 Finally, as an alternative measure of asset specificity we
have used the number of municipally owned museums per 10.000 inhabitants. This measure
has some clear shortcomings, as it does not capture the presence of public libraries, the
other relevant set of cultural facilities generally owned by municipalities. Furthermore, the
information is available only for 2006 and therefore the variable is fixed over time. This
alternative regressor is never significant.
9 Conclusion
Outsourcing of local public services has witnessed a growing trend for government policies in
the last decades. Several theoretical and empirical works have analyzed the distinct drivers
and conditions a◆ecting local governments’ choice for outsourcing, including fiscal, economic
and political factors. In this article we propose a first analysis of the determinants of a
government’s choice between outsourcing and in-house production in the field of cultural
services. We concentrate on grants and subsidies to cultural organizations, which we argue
28The subsample excludes Rome, Milan, Naples, Genoa, Turin, Bologna, Florence, Venice and Bari. Similar
results are obtained when excluding only Rome and Genoa, which are the two cities their cultural activities
are delegated to a company entirely owned by the municipal government, a case in which transfers are not a
good proxy for outsourcing.
29Each Autonomous Region has a specific status in this respect.
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may be considered as non contractual outsourcing within a government’s cultural policy.
Using data on 106 Italian cities over the 1998- 2008 period, we produce estimates of the impact
of several standard and sector-specific potential drivers of the relative share of subsidies in
total public cultural spending. Our results are in line with the literature on outsourcing in
general or in other public functions: outsourcing of cultural services is negatively a◆ected
by cultural assets specificity and is more likely to occur in cities subject to fiscal stress.
Furthermore, we find evidence of a peculiar electoral cycle by which incumbent mayors spend
less in cultural subsidies around an election year.
Finally, the relevance of our contribution is also methodological and goes beyond the
restricted field of cultural policy. Arguably, the use public transfers as a proxy for the value
of a government’s outsourced services allows to quantify them in a number governmental
functions so far not often considered by the literature on outsourcing.
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
In Table A1 we summarize the statistical properties of the main variables we use in our model 
specification. All variables are in real terms, except for the political variables (which are dummies 
or categorical variables) and those expressing ratios (CULTRASFRATIO and CULTASSET).  
 
The information in our Dataset has been obtained from different sources. 
Data on municipal expenditures and revenues come from the Database of the official ‘certificati 
consuntivi’ (final budget balances) made available by the Italian Home Office 
(http://finanzalocale.interno.it/apps/floc.php/in/cod/4, last access on 25.10.2012). Data on private 
cultural expenditure refer to banking foundations’ cultural spending and have been provided by 
ACRI (Associazione di Fondazioni e di Casse di Risparmio). As for socio-economic and tourism 
variables, the source is the National Statistical Office (ISTAT).  Income data refer to per capita tax 
base at municipal level and the source is the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
(http://www.finanze.it/export/finanze/Per_conoscere_il_fisco/Fiscalita_locale/addirpef/dati_statistic
i.htm). Political data on Italian municipalities have been collected by Fabio Padovano for IREF 
(Institut de Recherche Economique et Fiscal). Finally, data on consumer price and government 
wage deflators come from OECD Statistical Database (Source: http://www.oecd.org/statistics/, last 
access on 25.10.2012). 
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Table A1 – Summary Statistics 
Variable Description   Mean St.Dev. Min Max Observations 
                
overall 0.204 0.173 0 0.872 N =    1136 
between  0.153    Cultrasfratio 
ratio between current 
cultural transfers and 
current cultural expenditures within  0.082    
        
overall 12.537 69.254 -1535.547 284.370 N =    1157 
between  24.985    Deficit  Total expenditures minus revenues (per capita) 
within  64.762    
        
overall 29.131 20.159 0 163.317 N =    1149 
between  18.623    Othercultexp Per capita current cultural expenditures minus transfers 
within  8.624    
        
overall 16.275 30.346 1.510 272.434 N =    1165 
between  30.452    Population City Population (10.000) 
within  0.849    
        
overall 1.410 0.304 0.668 2.308 N =    1162 
between  0.301    Income Income per Capita (10.000) 
within  0.055    
        
overall 1.180 0.049 1.107 1.246 N =    1165 
between  0.0005    cpgw/cpi  
Ratio between government-
consumption price deflator 
and GDP deflator within  0.049    
        overall 0.398 0.241 0 1 N =    1126 
between  0.226    Cultasset 
Ratio between current 
expenditure in "libraries, 
museums and galleries" and 
Total current cultural 
expenditures within  0.081    
        
overall 21.400 62.362 0 821.495 N =    1129 
between  59.642    PrivCultexp 
Municipal banking 
foundations per capita 
cultural spending within  23.259    
        
overall 7.956 14.985 0.350 118.964 N = 1152 
between  14.358    Tourism 
Tourist accomodation 
establishements per 10.000 
inhabitants within  5.074    
        
overall 0.217 0.412 0 1 N =    1163 
between  0.047    Election year 1 if the year is an election year; 0 Otherwise 
within  0.410    
        
overall 0.604 0.488 0 1 N =    1153 
between  0.381    Leftright  
Municipal Government 
Political orientation; 1 (left), 
0.5 (centre) or 0 (right) within  0.309    
        
overall 0.361 0.480 0 1 N =    1163 
Between  0.170    Termlimit  1 in all years of a mayor’s last term; 0 otherwise 
Within  0.449    
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Table A2 – Comparison between variables used in the literature and here. 
  
Variables in existent literature Variables Adopted 
Fiscal Variables 
Legal limitations to short term 
borrowing (dummy) 
López-de-Silanes et al., 
1997 
State imposed debt limits (dummy) López-de-Silanes et al., 1997 
Fiscal rules 
Property tax limit (dummy) Brown and Potoski, 2003 
- 
        
size of transfers from central 
government Dijkgraaf et al. 2003 Deficit 
city debt/revenues Levin and Tadelis, 2010 Othercultexp 
Surplus(deficit)/total Budget Kodrzycki, 1998   
Measures of fiscal 
stress 
Interest payments/general revenues Kodrzycki, 1998   
        
Economic Efficiency Variables 
Asset specificity (indicator derived 
from survey involving city 
managers) 
Brown and Potoski, 2003 
Government ownership of facilities 
(dummy) Walls et al., 2005 
Transaction costs 
related measures 
Service Contracting difficulty  
(indicator composed from survey 
among city managers) 
Levin and Tadelis, 2010 
Cultasset 
        
Economies of scale in 
inhouse production/ 
supply of external 
contractors 
City population size All Population 
        
In house production 
efficiency - - cpgw/cpi  
Political Variables 
Ideology fraction of votes for political parties 
López-de-Silanes et al., 
1997 
Levin and Tadelis, 2010 
Dijkgraaf et al. 2003 
Walls et al., 2005 
Leftright  
        
Income per capita Walls et al., 2005 Income 
Fiscal capacity per capita Brown and Potoski, 2003 Tourism Interest group 
    PrivCultexp 
        
Unemployment 
Dijkgraaf et al. 2003 
López-de-Silanes et al., 
1997 
electionyear 
Number of civil servants 
Dijkgraaf et al. 2003 
López-de-Silanes et al., 
1997 
termlimit Political patronage 
Degree of unionization of public 
workers 
López-de-Silanes et al., 
1997 
Walls et al., 2005 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Sample average of per capita total and cultural current expenditures in current ! 
 
 
Fat line: yearly average of cities’ total current spending per capita (right axis) 
Thin line: yearly average of cities’ cultural current spending per capita (left axis) 
 
Figure 2: Sample average per capita current cultural spending, cultural expenditure without transfers and 
cultural transfers in cuurent ! 
 
 
Continuous line: yearly average of per capita cultural expenditures (right axis) 
Semi-continuous line: yearly average of pervcapitav cultural expenditures except transfers (right axis) 
Dotted line: yearly average of per capita cultural transfers (left axis)  
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Figure 3: Sample average of current cultural transfers and ratio of cultural transfers over cultural expenditures 
 
Dotted line: yearly average of per capita current cultural transfers in current ! (right axis) 
Continuous line: yearly average of ratio of current cultural transfers over total current cultural expenditure (left axis)  
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TABLES 
Table 1– Determinants of Italian municipal outsourcing in the cultural sector, 1998-2008 
              
Dependent Variable: Cultransfratio         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)a 
  FE FE Ar(1) AB GMM GMMsys 
0.451*** 0.608*** 0.595*** 0.571*** Cultransfratio(-1)   (0.573) 
(0.097) (0.0797) (0.0855) (0.0894) 
Deficitpc 0.0001*** 0.00007*** 0.00006** 0.00005** 0.00006*** 0.00006*** 
  (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00001) (-.0045) 
-0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00003 Deficitpc(-1)     
(0.00002) (0.00002) 
  
(0.00007) 
-0.0052*** -0.0047*** -0.0039*** -0.0038*** -0.0036*** -0.0045*** Othercultexp 
(0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.00007) 
0.0017* 0.0024** 0.0021*** 0.0024*** Othercultexp(-1)      
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
0.0019 0.0015 0.0018 -0.0005   -0.0006 Population 
(0.0027) (0.0012) (0.0059) (0.0041)   (0.0049) 
0.0059 -0.0005 -0.0004 Population (-1)      
(0.0046) (0.0048) 
  
(0.0053) 
-0.0342 0.0037 0.0128 0.0611 0.111*** 0.0797 Income 
(0.0453) (0.0379) (0.0803) (0.0535) (0.0317) (0.0637) 
Income(-1) 0.0139 0.0450   0.0626 
  
    
(0.0357) (0.0366)   (0.0494) 
0.0463 0.0926 -0.0860 0.0053   0.0949 cpgw/cpi  
(0.0988) (0.0658) (0.2717) (0.2739)   (0.2169) 
0.0883 0.0270   -0.0690 cpgw/cpi(-1)      
(0.2912) (0.2949)   (0.2838) 
-0.1064 -0.1082*** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.0997** -0.0930 cultAsset 
(0.0752) (0.0286) (0.0358) (0.0384) (0.0440) (0.0664) 
0.0189 0.0311 0.0013 cultAsset(-1)     
(0.0584) (0.0557) 
  
(0.0538) 
-0.0023 -0.0055 -0.0061 -0.0068* -0.0098** -0.0114** election year 
(0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0046) 
-0.0185 -0.0115 -0.0193 -0.0186   -0.0261 leftright  
(0.0120) (0.0081) (0.0185) (0.0232)   (0.0258) 
0.0004 -0.0105** -0.0118* -0.0140*   -0.0103 termlimit  
(0.0074) (0.0053) (0.0061) (0.0072)   (0.0120) 
              
Observations 1108 1003 877 992 1003 992 
R2 0.061 0.071         
Number of Instruments     60 69 60 123 
Estat AB(1)      -3.282*** -3.727*** -3.787*** -3.598*** 
Estat AB(2)     -0.547 -0.352 -0.269 -0.43667 
  
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
All GMM estimatio GMM estimates show two steps results with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. 
a - estimations with correction for potential endogeneity of cultexpnotransf variable. 
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Table 2 – Determinants of Italian municipal outsourcing in the cultural sector: other depvars. 
  (7) (8) (9)a   (10) (11) (12)a 
  Depvar = Cultransflevel   Depvar = grants to private sector  
0.538*** 0.573*** 0.671*** 0.517*** 0.539*** 0.531*** depvar(-1) 
(0.1442) (0.1343) (0.0511) 
  
(0.1013) (0.0901) (0.1226) 
0.0063*** 0.0053*** 0.007** 0.00007** 0.00005** 0.00008** Deficitpc 
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0031) 
  
(0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00004) 
0.0015   -0.0006 -0.00002   -0.00001 Deficitpc(-1) 
(0.0029)  (0.0037) 
  
(0.00006)   (0.00007) 
-0.156*** -0.138** -0.199*** -0.0033*** -0.0036*** -0.0041*** Othercultexp 
(0.0425) (0.0547) (0.0456) 
  
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
0.018588   0.102** 0.0015 0.0021*** 0.0021 Othercultexp(-1) 
(0.0825)  (0.0443) 
  
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0014) 
-0.3811   -0.2720 -0.0012   -0.0019 Population 
(0.3602)  (0.7089) 
  
(0.00532)   (0.0064) 
0.3495 0.0971 0.0019   0.0023 Population(-1) 
(0.3378) 
  
(0.7899) 
  
(0.005278)   (0.0063) 
14.554** 17.866*** 9.339*** 0.0927 0.150*** 0.0689 Income 
(7.1247) (6.8937) (3.0265) 
  
(0.08344) (0.0295) (0.1008) 
5.710* 2.647 0.0966   0.0915 Income(-1) 
(2.9989) 
  
(3.5670) 
  
(0.0651)    (0.0855) 
12.765 6.004 0.0631   -0.0792 Cpgw/cpi 
(22.0554) 
  
(22.9633) 
  
(0.3093)    (0.3286) 
-16.358 -9.112 -0.1208   0.0420 Cpgw/cpi(-1) 
(22.6253) 
  
(26.3869) 
  
(0.3393)    (0.4790) 
-9.228* -10.554** -10.335** -0.0989** -0.1248** -0.0912 CultAsset 
(5.1215) (4.4194) (4.5305) 
  
(0.0482) (0.0544) (0.0614) 
0.992 6.066* 0.0217   0.0283 CultAsset(-1) 
(4.0532) 
  
(3.2248) 
  
(0.0520)    (0.0501) 
-0.712** -1.124*** -0.951** -0.0104** -0.0151*** 0.0062* Election year 
(0.3317) (0.3687) (0.4726) 
  
(0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0062) 
0.0271 -0.735 -0.0169   -0.0268 Leftright 
(1.0105) 
  
(1.0822) 
  
(0.0223)   (0.0190) 
-0.2813 -0.073 -0.0008   -0.0012 Termlimit 
(0.5764) 
  
(0.9771) 
  
(0.0070)    (0.0153) 
                
Observations 993 1004 993   993 1003 993 
Number of 
Instruments 
69 59 123   69 60 123 
AR(1) -2.757*** -2.989*** -3.628***   -3.349*** -3.831*** -3.374*** 
AR(2) -1.362 -1.2478 -1.1679   -0.1348 -0.0027 -1.119 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
GMM estimates show two steps results with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. 
a - estimations with correction for potential endogeneity of cultexpnotransf variable. 
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Table 3 – Role of local Private Patrons and Tourism on cultural outsourcing, Italian Cities 1998-2008 
Dependent Variable: Cultransfratio 
  (13) (14) (15) a   (16) (17) (18) a 
  Private Cultural Expenditure   Tourism  
Tourism 
  
0.584*** 0.581*** 0.547*** 0.605*** 0.603*** 0.565*** depvar(-1) 
(0.0884) (0.0859) (0.1689 ) 
  
(0.0806) (0.0877) (0.1183) 
0.00005**
* 
0.00005*** 0.00006*** 0.00005** 0.00005*** 0.00007*** Deficitpc 
(0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) 
  
(0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) 
-0.00002     -0.00002 -0.00003   -0.00003 Deficitpc(-1) 
(0.00002)   (0.00005) 
  
(0.00002)   (0.00008) 
-0.0037*** -0.0035*** -0.0043*** -0.003*** -0.0036*** -0.0043*** Othercultexp 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
  
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
0.0016* 0.0017*** 0.0021* 0.002** 0.0022*** 0.0024*** Othercultexp(-1) 
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0010) 
  
(0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0009) 
-0.0014   -0.0021 -0.0008   -0.0006 Population 
(0.0033)   (0.0042) 
  
(0.0041)   (0.0043) 
0.0005 0.0010 -0.0001   -0.0003** Population(-1) 
(0.0035) 
  
(0.0042) 
  
(0.0047)   (0.0044) 
0.0413 0.126*** 0.0582 0.0624 0.106*** 0.0731 Income 
(0.0589) (0.0370) (0.0653) 
  
(0.0534) (0.0316) (0.0773) 
0.0614 0.0698 0.0438   0.0601 Income(-1) 
(0.0378) 
  
(0.0493) 
  
(0.0358)   (0.0434) 
0.0946 0.1060 -0.0211   0.0666 Cpgw/cpi 
(0.2365) 
  
(0.2846) 
  
(0.2760)   (0.2920) 
-0.0256 -0.0436 0.0500   -0.0325 Cpgw/cpi(-1) 
(0.2543) 
  
(0.3215) 
  
(0.2995)   (0.3616) 
-0.1021** -0.0993** -0.0844* -0.107*** -0.097** -0.0853 CultAsset 
(0.0417) (0.0495) (0.0456 ) 
  
(0.0390) (0.0452) (0.0617) 
-0.0121 -0.0244 0.0288   -0.0006 CultAsset(-1) 
(0.0529) 
  
(0.0444) 
  
(0.0541)   (0.0450) 
-0.0071* -0.0128*** -0.0127*** -0.0070* -0.0093** -0.0108** Election year 
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0045) 
  
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0051) 
-0.0107 -0.0206 -0.0180   -0.0265 Leftright 
(0.0165) 
  
(0.0182) 
  
(0.0226)   (0.0235) 
-0.0079 -0.0037 -0.0140**   -0.0106 Termlimit 
(0.0072) 
  
(0.0098) 
  
(0.0072)   (0.0109) 
-0.0002 -0.0001 -0.00003       PrivCultexp 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
  
      
-0.0001 -0.00007 -0.00003       PrivCultexp(-1) 
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
  
      
0.0001 -0.00006 -0.00001 Tourism         
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
                Observations 953 964 953   986 997 986 
Number of Instruments 71 62 125   70 61 124 
AR(1) -4.198*** -4.326*** -2.963***   -3.724*** -3.774*** -3.302*** 
AR(2) -0.025 0.329 -0.115   -0.326 -0.238 -0.428 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
GMM estimates show two steps results with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. 
a - estimations with correction for potential endogeneity of cultexpnotransf variable. 
 
